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Copyright’s Online Destiny, or: How to Stop Worrying and Love
the Net
by Chad Guo1
Introduction

1

The controversy surrounding the Stop Online
Piracy Act (SOPA) and the PROTECT Intellectual
Property Act (PIPA) served both as the latest in a long
line of conflicts between technology and copyright
holders and also as an indication of things to come.
While the need to reconcile the copyright interest of
content producers with the interests of technological
developers remains of principal importance, the SOPA/
PIPA protest introduced an increasingly powerful
element—the interest of content consumers and
technology users. In terms of legal implications, the
rise of the consumers as a force to be reckoned with
represents a failure in the online intellectual property
market at best and a reassertion of the fundamentally
anarchical culture of cyberspace at worst. To remain
relevant in the online context, copyright law must
return to its most basic roots, where its primary purpose
of serving the public interest aligns closest with the
needs of the cyberspace community.
The struggle between copyright and technology
seems like a tale as old as time, made more pronounced
by the unique attributes of the Internet. Ever since
the Internet emerged as a medium for the fast and
seemingly unlimited distribution of copyrighted
works, a war has been brewing between copyright
and technology. Copyright owners have tried to
maintain the same rights and control over their creative
works that they had outside of the digital world.
Meanwhile, the developers and users of technology
create new capabilities and habits that perhaps
unintentionally, but quite effectively frustrate all efforts
at traditional copyright enforcement. Skirmishes flare
up occasionally—usually when a new technology
threatens to further reduce the control of copyright
owners.2 Thus, in a way, the SOPA/PIPA debacle was
1. Chao “Chad” Guo is a 2013 J.D. candidate at the American
University Washington College of Law, where he works as a student
attorney for the Glushko-Samuelson Intellectual Property Law
Clinic. He holds a B.A. double major in English and International
Relations from the University of Virginia. Chad would like to thank
Professor Michael Carroll, Brian Dudley, and Alexandra Sternberg
for their help on this article.
2. See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
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merely the latest incident to break the fragile détente.
On the other hand, an interesting new
development occurred when a counteroffensive led by
online entities successfully repelled the most recent
copyright incursion into the online world.3 The key
to the victory lay in the empowering of consumers as
an effective lobbying force, as many websites directed
visitors to call or write their Congressmen.4 Faced
with unexpected pressure from their constituents, many
lawmakers reconsidered or abandoned their support for
the legislation.5 Consequently, the SOPA/PIPA bills
ended up on the congressional backburner.6
The grassroots effort of the SOPA/PIPA
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 417 (1984) (regarding videocassette recorder
technology); Am. Broad. Co., Inc., v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp.
2d 373, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (detailing a technology that enables
television watching online); Brian Stelter, A DVR Ad Eraser Causes
Tremors at TV Upfronts, N.Y. Times, May 16, 2012, http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/05/17/business/media/dish-networks-hoppercuts-ads-and-causes-tremors-at-tv-upfronts.html?pagewanted=all
(“Some reviewers have already called the feature, named Auto
Hop, a dream come true for consumers. But for broadcasters and
advertisers, it is an attack on an entrenched television business
model, and it must be strangled, lest it spread.”).
3. See Amy Chozick, Tech and Media Elite Are Likely to
Debate Piracy, N.Y. Times
July 9, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/07/10/business/media/tech-and-media-elite-are-likely-todebate-piracy.html?_r=0 (“Congress, overwhelmed by the popular
opposition, quickly backpedaled, leaving the legislation to die.”).
4. Deborah Netburn, Wikipedia: SOPA protest led 8 million
to look up reps in Congress, L.A. Times Blog (Jan. 19, 2012,
10:42 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2012/01/
wikipedia-sopa-blackout-congressional-representatives.html
(reporting that “8 million U.S. readers took Wikipedia’s suggestion
and looked up their congressional reps from the site” while “4.5
million people had signed [Google’s] petition asking lawmakers to
reject [SOPA and PIPA]”).
5. See Paul Tassi, Internet Blackout Causes 18 Senators to
Flee from PIPA, Forbes.com
(Jan. 19, 2012, 9:29 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
insertcoin/2012/01/19/internet-blackout-causes-18-senators-to-fleefrom-pipa/ (including a list of Senators who withdrew support for
the bill).
6. Stephanie Condon, PIPA, SOPA put on hold in wake of
protests, CBSNews.com
(Jan. 20, 2012, 9:41 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301503544_162-57362675-503544/pipa-sopa-put-on-hold-in-wakeof-protests/ (“Senate and House leaders announced Friday they are
postponing work on two controversial anti-piracy bills in the wake
of large online protests that spurred several congressmen to rethink
the legislation.”).
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protestors also highlights the importance of the law in
the ongoing conflict. While copyright holders have
consistently looked to copyright law for support as
they advance towards gaining more ground, copyright
law may just as well serve the purposes of the online
community in resisting efforts to control the Internet
and its users. In other words, the Internet community’s
apparent belief—that copyright holders’ need to
be compensated fully7 for the use of their creative
works online should defer to the interest of a free
and open Internet—could very well have support in
legal doctrines.8 These doctrines then could provide
a way to harmonize intellectual property law with
online behavior and perhaps provide some measure of
satisfaction to all parties.
This Article discusses the role of copyright law
as applied to the Internet environment in light of past
and current developments involving copyright holders,
technology developers, and now consumers. Part I
provides a brief background on the jurisprudence of
copyright law as applied to technological developments
in the entertainment and related industries. Part II
examines both statutory and case law that supports
the separation of copyright’s exclusive rights from
traditional, direct financial compensation to copyright
holders. Part III explores the policy implications of
altering the compensation scheme of copyright holders
on the Internet. Finally, Part IV concludes that the law
need only serve the public interest, and it is the industry
that must compromise when faced with a conflict
between copyright and technology.
I.		

Background

The purpose of copyright is explicitly stated in
the highest law of the land. Given its progress-oriented
purpose, it is paradoxical how often copyright struggles
when faced with new, groundbreaking technology.
An examination of the jurisprudence of copyright law
encountering new technologies may help to shed some
light into this paradoxical relationship.
A.

The Original Purpose and Subsequent
Codifications of Copyright Law

Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United
States Constitution provides: “The Congress shall have
Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
7. Compensated “fully” means that copyright holders would
be compensated under purely market-based conditions, as opposed
to statutorily determined compensation or no compensation at all.
8. See infra Part II.

Writings and Discoveries.”9 Other fields of law should
be so lucky as to have their purpose so explicitly stated
in the ultimate source of their authority.10
The goal of copyright does not focus so much
on the interests of the authors and inventors as it does
on the public interest goal of promoting progress
of the sciences, which has been interpreted to mean
knowledge and creativity in general.11 Providing
financial compensation to authors and inventors is
merely the means by which creative advancements
are incentivized, but financial compensation is not
the end goal itself.12 By that logic, then, in instances
where the public interest would best be achieved by
limiting or denying an author or inventor the exclusive
right to his or her works, the law should and can
readily support such curtailment.13 The Copyright
Act already specifically limits the copyright holder’s
exclusive rights to an enumerated bundle.14 The rights
granted by copyright law are also limited to a specific
set.15 These include, among others, the exclusive
right of reproduction and the exclusive right of public
performance.16
In addition to the limitation of enumerating
the rights available to copyright holders, two legal
doctrines limit these rights even further. First, the
constitutional clause itself provides for “limited times”
during which the author’s right to his or her work is
exclusive.17 This notion is reflected in the doctrine
of public domain, by which the author’s exclusive
9. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
10. But see William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property,
in New Essays in the Legal and Political Theory of Property 168,
171–74 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001) (surveying three additional
theories of intellectual property).
11. See Infodek, Inc. v. Meredith-Webb Printing Co., Inc.,
830 F. Supp. 614, 621 n.8 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (“[T]he use of the term
‘science’ relates to copyrights and is generally given its eighteenth
century meaning of knowledge or learning.”).
12. When considering who is being incentivized, it is
important to note that the incentives are not solely for those who
create copyrighted works, but also extends to those who would
invest and produce the works. Producers and investors require
assurance that the money they put into a creative endeavor will
yield fruit. 144 Cong. Rec. H9950 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998)
(statement of Rep. Coble) (“When works are protected by
copyright, they attract investors who can exploit the work for
profit.”). This means that copyright also protects the investment
interests of persons or entities other than the artists themselves.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 14–20.
14. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
15. Id.
16. Id. § 106(1), (4).
17. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have
Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”) (emphasis
added).
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property rights in a work are terminated by the simple
passage of time.18 Once a work enters into the public
domain, parties other than the author may use or enjoy
the work however they wish.
Second, copyright law recognizes the doctrine
of fair use.19 Fair use directly invokes the public
interest purpose of copyright by denying authors an
exclusive right to their work when usage by another
party is perceived to be fair in the eyes of the law.20 For
both public domain and fair use, the copyright holder
has no control over his or her original work. This has
resulted in numerous interpretations of narratives in
the public domain21 as well as diverse commentary and
criticism on certain works through fair use.22
On principle, the Copyright Clause of the
Constitution and the Copyright Act form the most
basic understanding of copyright. The verbiage and
the legal doctrines created by the texts are clearly
directed at serving the public interest. Yet in practice,
copyright, or at least the perception of copyright,
has been viewed as serving the interests of certain
industries at the expense of the larger public.23 The true
intent of copyright law is often lost in conversations
18. 17 U.S.C. §§ 301–04 (2006).
19. Id. § 107.
20. While fair use is recognized as a defense to copyright
infringement, there is a school of thought that would deem fair use
to be a right in and of itself. Compare Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985) (“The drafters
resisted pressures from special interest groups to create presumptive
categories of fair use, but structured the provision as an affirmative
defense requiring a case-by-case analysis.”), with Peter Jaszi,
Copyright, Fair Use and Motion Pictures, 3 Utah L. Rev. 715, 719
(2007) (“More recently, the United States Supreme Court has made
it clear that fair use is one of the mechanisms by which copyright
recognizes the principle of freedom of expression that is enshrined
in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: without fair
use, copyright law could be found unconstitutional as applied to
expressive activities . . . .”). In other words, if copyright protection
is an exception to the right to free speech, and fair use is the
exception to copyright protection, does not fair use simply restore
the right to free speech? See id. at 719.
21. See The League of Extraordinary Gentlemen (20th
Century Fox 2003) (noting that the movie was based on a film
adaptation of a comic series that utilizes characters almost entirely
from the public domain such as Allan Quatermain, Captain Nemo,
Ishmael, and Tom Sawyer); Trivia for The League of Extraordinary
Gentlemen (2003), IMDB.com, http://www.imdb.com/title/
tt0311429/trivia (last visited Oct. 20, 2012) (“All of the characters
except [one] have fallen into the public domain, which means that
anybody can write about them.”).
22. See generally Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, app. A, B (1994).
23. See Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48
UCLA L. Rev. 1057, 1069 (2001) (“The ordinary person doesn’t
notice, because the ordinary person has become so accustomed to
the idea that culture is managed—that corporations decide what
gets released when, and that the law can be used to protect criticism
when the law is being used to protect property—that the ordinary
person can’t imagine the world of balance our Framers created.”).
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involving the vast amounts of revenue generated by
the sale of copyrighted works. Just precisely how this
contradictory perception came into being involves
looking into a most curious legal history.
To their credit, United States courts have long
recognized the public interest aim of copyright law.
This purpose is perhaps best articulated by the Second
Circuit in Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc.,24 a case
about song parody lyrics published in a magazine. In
Berlin, the copyright owners brought suit against Mad
Magazine for infringing on the copyrighted lyrics of
twenty-five popular songs.25 While finding that there
was no infringement, the court also laid out the purpose
of copyright law quite clearly. The court elaborated
that “the financial reward guaranteed to the copyright
holder is but an incident of this general objective,
rather than an end in itself.”26 The court then stated,
“[a]s a result, courts in passing upon particular claims
of infringement must occasionally subordinate the
copyright holder’s interest in a maximum financial
return to the greater public interest in the development
of art, science and industry.”27 This fluid standard—
balancing the interests of copyright holders with those
of the public as particular infringement claims arose—
would be put to the test time and again, as the next
section demonstrates.
B.

Traditional Copyright Versus New
Technology

The clear purpose of copyright law
notwithstanding, numerous fights have emerged and
presented many opportunities for lawmakers to address
how copyright applies to emerging technologies. A
prominent illustration of such a conflict occurred when
cable television emerged and threatened the exclusive
right of transmission of the copyright holders through
broadcast television.28 The conflict seemingly wrote
the script for future battles: 1) in the exposition, a
technology emerges that makes copyrighted content
more accessible to the public; 2) however, the
technology renders the current efforts of the copyright
holder to receive compensation for his or her work
more difficult, if not impossible; 3) as the action rises,
the copyright holder looks to the law to exercise some
measure of control over the new technology so that the
current copyright enforcement efforts remain effective;
which in turn leads to 4) the climactic battle in the
24. 329 F.2d 541 (2nd Cir. 1964).
25. Id. at 542.
26. Id. at 543–44.
27. Id. at 544.
28. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 88–89 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5703.
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courts for a resolution.
When cable television first emerged, it allowed
certain areas to receive broadcast television that had
previously been unavailable due to poor over-theair reception.29 However, the mechanism by which
cable infrastructure received the broadcast television
signals and then transmitted the signals to consumers
implicated one of the enumerated exclusive rights
of those who held the copyrights to the broadcasted
content.30 This created a dilemma. Though the
broadcasters’ content reached a larger audience through
cable technology, the broadcasters needed some
measure of control over the retransmission of their
content pursuant to copyright law.31 Copyright law
allows for broadcasters to consent to the retransmission
of their content in exchange for compensation.32
However, cable providers argued that having to
negotiate retransmission consent fees with each
and every broadcaster would be burdensome and
inefficient, especially when broadcast signals were free
over the air.33
The conflict between television broadcasters
and cable technology resulted in a compromise—
namely, the statutory licensing scheme that has since
been applied to several other technologies.34 At a basic
level, statutory licensing allows for anyone to make
and distribute reproductions of copyrighted works
without the consent of the copyright owner as long as
that person pays a statutorily established royalty to the
copyright owner. In addition to cable retransmission,
statutory licensing has been applied to satellite
retransmission of broadcast television signals as well as
29. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television,
Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 391–92 (1968) (providing some background
information on an early cable system); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at
88, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5702–03 (“A typical system
consists of a central antenna which receives and amplifies television
signals and a network of cables through which the signals are
transmitted to the receiving sets of individual subscribers.”).
30. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2006) (granting copyright holders
the exclusive right of public performance). Public performance
has been interpreted to include the transmission and broadcasting
of television signals. See David v. Showtime/The Movie Channel,
Inc., 697 F. Supp. 752, 758–59 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). However, this
interpretation was not always the case. See Teleprompter Corp. v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 408–09 (explaining that
the regulation was subsequently superseded by statute, which led
to the statutory licensing scheme in place today); Fortnightly, 392
U.S. at 400–01.
31. See Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 391–92.
32. See 47 U.S.C. § 325(b) (2006).
33. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 89, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5704 (“The Committee recognizes, however, that it
would be impractical and unduly burdensome to require every cable
system to negotiate with every copyright owner whose work was
retransmitted by a cable system.”).
34. 17 U.S.C. §111(c) (2006); see also Id. §§ 114(d)(1), (2).

retransmission of audio works over Internet radio.35
A few years later, the emergence of the
videocassette recorder (VCR) also posed a problem
to copyright holders in the motion picture industry.
Videocassette recorders were challenged as copyright
infringing technology in a case that reached the
Supreme Court. In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc.,36 various entertainment studios sued
the manufacturers of home VCR’s and alleged that use
of the recorders amounted to copyright infringement
of commercially sponsored television.37 Universal
Studios argued that by selling the allegedly infringing
technology, the manufacturers were liable for
contributory copyright infringement.38 The Court held
that the sale of VCR’s did not constitute contributory
copyright infringement.39 The Sony Court made a point
to note that copyrights were not designed to provide a
special private benefit.40 Instead, the Court noted that
the granting of copyrights is only a means to achieve an
important public purpose, namely to motivate creative
activity and to allow public access to the products of
creative activity.41
After the Sony decision, Congress passed the
Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA) in 1992.42 Like
statutory licensing before it, the AHRA codified a
compromise between copyright holders—the movie
industry—and technology developers—in this case,
the producers of VCRs.43 The AHRA created a blank
media levy that required developers of recording
devices and blank media to pay royalties to copyright
holders based on a statutorily defined formula.44 In
exchange, the developers were granted immunity from
claims for copyright infringement.45 While the blank
media levy has very notable limitations,46 the royalty
system allows for the coexistence of copyrighted works
alongside technology that perfects making copies of
such works.47
35. Currently, while statutory licensing covers transmissions
via Internet radio, it does not cover the permanent downloading and
copying of works over the Internet. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1).
36. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
37. Id. at 417.
38. Id. at 419.
39. Id. at 417.
40. Id. at 429.
41. Id.
42. 17 U.S.C. ch. 10 (2006).
43. Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing S.
1623, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3609.
44. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1003–04 (2006).
45. See id. § 1008.
46. See Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond
Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1999)
(excluding computer hard drives from the scope of the AHRA).
47. Although Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
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In both instances with cable and recording
technologies, the law recognized that a compromise,
a give and take, was preferable to strictly enforcing
the provisions of the Copyright Act. Curiously, when
the Internet and its associated technologies implicate
copyright law, the law has followed another path, and
copyright holders have opted to enforce copyright
protections instead of compromising for mutual
benefit. The information sharing capabilities of the
Internet presented problems the likes of which the
entertainment industries have never seen. Not only
could perfect copies of copyrighted music be created,
but the copies also could be distributed instantaneously
to potential consumers worldwide. The unauthorized
copying and distributing of copyright works became
known as piracy.48 Concern over the Internet’s
effect on copyright led Congress to pass the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in 1998.49 The
DMCA was meant to strengthen copyright protections
in the online context.50 However, there were still
questions that needed answering in the courtroom.
The online activity of file-sharing earned
the wrath of the music industry in 2001.51 A circuit
Inc., had already solidified the legality of videocassette recorders,
the AHRA allowed for fuller coverage of all audio recording
technology—and blank media used to facilitating recording—that
fell within its scope.
48. The word choice, “piracy,” is both inaccurate and
unfortunate. The term is inaccurate because copyright infringement
is not quite the same as theft—and copyright holders had a difficult
time convincing the public to perceive it as such. Theft implies that
the copyright holder is deprived enjoyment of the property after
the unauthorized copying. See Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed.
2009); see also Theft, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/theft (last visited Oct. 19,
2012). However, this is not the case because only a copy is made
and the original remains untouched with its owner. Nor can the
unauthorized distributor be said to be taking the prospective profits
of the copyright holder since there is no guarantee that a consumer
would reliably buy something that is not available for free. The
piracy label also proves unfortunate due to the romantic notions
associated with classical pirates in popular culture, and many socalled online pirates embraced the nomenclature. See The Pirate
Bay: About, ThePirateBay.se, https://thepiratebay.se/about (last
visited Oct. 20, 2012).
49. Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing
H.R. 2281, 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 671.
50. Id. The DMCA represents the United States’
implementation of the World Intellectual Property Organization’s
twin treaties meant to address the concerns about copyright in
the digital age. Id. An important provision in the DMCA is its
safe harbor provision, which provides immunity to online service
providers from copyright infringement under certain conditions.
See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
51. File-sharing presented an interesting case because it was
not immediately apparent that such behavior implicated one of
the exclusive rights of copyright holders. Unlike downloading
from a website, which is analogous to direct reproduction,
file-sharing could be viewed as merely the sharing by users of
copyright-protected songs they already purchased. But see A&M
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court held in a subsequent case that the uploading
and downloading of copyrighted works was not fair
use. In A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,52 the Ninth
Circuit examined the activities of the then popular
online file-sharing service Napster with respect to
interpersonal transmission of copyrighted works. The
Napster court ruled that facilitating the downloading of
copyrighted music infringed upon the exclusive right
of reproduction and distribution.53 Furthermore, using
copyright works in this way does not qualify as fair
use.54
The Supreme Court later strengthened the
copyright holders’ victory over file-sharing. In MGM
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,55 the Court unanimously
held that file-sharing companies could be liable for
inducing copyright infringement.56 In Grokster, the
file-sharing companies sought to rely on the Sony
decision,57 which had held that the mere production
of technology capable of facilitating copyright
infringement could not constitute contributory
infringement if the technology had substantial noninfringing uses.58 However, the Grokster Court
distinguished the Sony decision by holding that when
a company induces infringing behavior through the
promotion of its technology, it no longer has the
protection of Sony.59
Despite these victories, copyright holders
still claim to suffer considerable harm from the
unauthorized consumption of media on the Internet.60
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001)
(discussing how direct economic benefit is not required for a finding
that an allegedly infringing use is commercial in nature).
52. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
53. Id. at 1014.
54. Id. at 1019. After Napster, it is firmly established in legal
jurisprudence that downloading and file-sharing of copyrighted
music infringes upon a copyright holder’s rights. However, could
such behavior still be permitted? The question is this: could
Napster have survived (legally) if it, or Internet service providers,
had paid statutory royalties to the copyright holders? The Napster
court declined to allow Napster to use a compulsory license
scheme because it could not reconcile Napster’s service with any
of the enumerated circumstances in copyright law that allowed for
compulsory licenses. Id. at 1028. However, the implication is an
amendment would be necessary to bring online activities such as
file-sharing within the purview of statutory licensing.
55. 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
56. Id. at 913–14.
57. Id. at 933.
58. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 417 (1984).
59. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 935–36.
60. See Motion Pictures Association of America Industry
Reports, MPAA.org, http://www.mpaa.org/policy/industry (last
visited Oct. 22, 2012) (containing a list of industry reports on the
harms of online piracy and copyright infringement); Recording
Industry Association of America Piracy Impact Studies, RIAA.com,
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Most recently, these industries supported SOPA and
PIPA as the latest push towards tightening enforcement
of copyright laws.61 Yet the pushback from the online
community, bolstered by public support, stymied the
efforts of the copyright holders.62 Perhaps then, in light
of the apparent failures of these enforcement efforts,
a statutory compromise may yet provide the proper
solution.
II.		Statutory Solutions in the Analogous 		
	Situations of Cable Television and Digital
Audio Recording Devices Provide Ample
	Support for a Compromise between Copyright
	Holders and Internet Interests
Copyright holders certainly have good cause
for clinging to the traditional business model of making
money directly from selling their copyrighted content
in the marketplace. This traditional business model has
worked splendidly for the entertainment industries.63
Given the highly lucrative nature of the entertainment
industry, marketplace financial compensation serves
as a very strong incentive for business as usual.64
However, from a legal standpoint, no reason exists as to
why copyright law should concern itself with ensuring
the traditional business model survives in the Internet
age.65

http://www.riaa.com/keystatistics.php?content_selector=researchreport-journal-academic (last visited Oct. 22, 2012). For
the purposes of this Article, the harm and losses claimed by
the entertainment industry are presumed to be accurate and
unexaggerated.
61. Cecilia Kang, House introduces Internet piracy bill,
Post Tech (Oct. 26, 2011, 6:12 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/blogs/post-tech/post/house-introduces-internet-piracybill/2011/10/26/gIQA0f5xJM_blog.html (“Hollywood, media firms
and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce immediately hailed the bill,
saying the government needs to take a stronger stance to prevent the
rampant illegal use of online content.”).
62. See Art Brodsky, The Web Can’t Declare Victory Just Yet—
If Ever, Pub. Knowledge Pol’y Blog (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.
publicknowledge.org/blog/web-cant-declare-victory-just-yet-if-ever
(detailing the efforts and effects of the SOPA/PIPA protests).
63. See generally Domestic Movie Theatrical Market
Summary 1995 to 2012, The-Numbers.com, http://www.thenumbers.com/market/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2012) (providing figures
for the movie industry).
64. It is debatable whether business as usual has yielded
any real creativity or has merely resulted in studios churning out
simplistic product to cater to the widest audience possible. Courts
do not make judgments on the artistic merits of creative works,
nor should they. Instead, whether financial compensation actually
stimulates creativity, or in other words, does money actually
produce true art, is a discussion best left to liberal arts scholars.
However, there is an argument to be made that genuine artistic
expression is not and cannot be motivated by financial gain.
65. See Berlin v. E.C. Publ’ns, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 543–44
(2nd Cir. 1964).

A.

The Law Does Not Require MarketBased Compensation to Copyright
Holders

The text of the Constitution and copyright law
unquestionably demonstrate that copyright is a limited
right, conditioned on the principle that it must serve
the public interest.66 In that sense, copyright more
closely resembles a privilege than a right. Accordingly,
there are important statutory limitations—namely
public domain and fair use—on the exclusive right of
copyright holders.67
Under both public domain and fair use, the
copyright holder receives no compensation for the
consumption or use of their copyrighted work.68
Therefore, these doctrines support the notion that
financial compensation, although by far the most
popular means of incentivizing creativity, is not the end
goal of copyright, but rather a means to an end.69
The many instances during which an emerging
technology threatened to upset the established business
model of entrenched entities demonstrate that, very
often, the two sides struck a deal and compromised
to allow the introduction of the technology, while
ensuring that copyright owners received some measure
of compensation for the curtailment of their exclusive
rights. The emergence of cable technology threatened
the broadcast industry and led to the compromise of
statutory licensing.70 Like cable technology, which
infringed upon the broadcast industry’s exclusive right
of public performance, the Internet and its content
distribution technologies infringe upon the music and
motion picture industries’ right of reproduction. Also,
like the numerous broadcasters with which cable
companies would have had to negotiate retransmission
consent, the number of musical and motion picture
copyright holders with which Internet providers71
66. See supra Part I. a.; see also U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.
8; 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (enumerating rights); 17 U.S.C. § 107
(2006) (codifying fair use); 17 U.S.C. §§ 301–04 (2006) (setting the
limited duration of copyrights).
67. The statutorily created limitations make a great deal of
sense when viewing copyright law in its proper context. Copyright
law and intellectual property law in general, by their very nature,
infringe upon one of humanity’s most important freedoms—the
freedom of speech or expression. See Jaszi, supra note 20, at 719.
68. Copyright holders receive no compensation from public
domain or fair use because they do not have the exclusive rights to
their works under these two doctrines.
69. See Berlin, 329 F.2d at 543–44.
70. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 89 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5704.
71. Internet service providers, as the gatekeepers of the
Internet, are probably the party on whom it makes the most sense
to place the responsibility of collecting fees for statutory licensing.
See William W. Fisher III, Promises to Keep 219 (Stanford
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would have to negotiate separate licensing fees would
also be astronomical. Lawmakers recognized that such
inefficiency justifies the implementation of statutory
licenses for cable providers.72 Similarly, lawmakers
could also recognize that requiring Internet service
providers to negotiate licensing fees for music online
would be burdensome to the point of inefficiency.73
Therefore, the framework of a statutory license could
easily be applied to the online context.74
Similarly, the advent of digital recording
technologies led to the compromise now found in the
statutory language of the Audio Home Recording Act.
Like digital audio recording devices, which allowed
consumers to record copyrighted music,75 the Internet
also greatly facilitates the duplication of copyrighted
music and movies. Also, like the developers of
digital recording technologies who wanted protection
from copyright infringement suits while being able
to continue manufacturing their products,76 Internet
technology developers also would likely desire
legal assurances that both the development of their
technology could continue and that they would not be
made liable for any infringement claims. Lawmakers
codified a compromise that exchanged statutorily
defined royalties for protection from infringement
suit liability.77 Likewise, lawmakers could also use
similar statutory terms to allow copyright holders and
Internet technology developers to come to a similar
compromise.
No such compromise has been brokered for
the Internet, but the established framework from either
statutory licensing or AHRA blank media royalties78 are
readily applicable.79 The question becomes whether
such a solution would resolve the concerns of all the
University Press 2004).
72. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 89, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5704.
73. Id. (demonstrating congressional recognition of the burden
of excessive negotiations).
74. The exact fee amount would still be a point of negotiation
between the interested parties, as it was with statutory licensing.
75. See Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond
Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1073–74 (9th Cir. 1999)
(explaining the “brave new world of Internet music distribution” by
describing how digital recording technology works).
76. See H.R. Rep. No. 102-873(I), at 24 (1992) (describing the
exemptions as “critical components” of the legislation).
77. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1003, 1008 (2006).
78. The compensation system under the AHRA is far from
perfect, but imperfect compensation still is legal because copyright
law does not require financial compensation to be equal to market
levels. See discussion supra Section II.A.
79. See Fisher, supra note 71, at 202–03; A Better Way
Forward: Voluntary Collective Licensing of Music File Sharing,
EFF.org, https://www.eff.org/wp/better-way-forward-voluntarycollective-licensing-music-file-sharing (last visited Oct. 19, 2012).
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parties involved. This includes the copyright holders,
the developers of Internet and related technologies, and
now the consumers.
B.

Statutorily Defined Compensation
Would Resolve the Conflict Between
Copyright Holders and Internet
Interests

If the provisions of the new compensation
scheme mirror those of previous ones, they will address
many of the problems caused by consumption of
copyrighted works on the Internet. Copyright holders
would be guaranteed a way to receive compensation
for their works. Internet service providers would be
shielded from liability. In theory,80 all parties should
take away some measure of satisfaction.
Theoretically, copyright holders will be able
to receive steady compensation for producing content
that goes onto the Internet, though the compensation
scheme will not necessarily be perfect. Indeed, they
would have to gamble all of the revenue currently
generated through direct sales in the market in hopes
of recovering the revenue through the new statutorily
defined compensation system. Depending on how
the statutory compensation is set, revenue from the
new compensation may not satisfactorily cover their
losses. However, if piracy truly deprives them of the
amount of revenue that they claim, perhaps imperfect
compensation would nevertheless be preferable to the
current system. This dynamic is perhaps already the
generally accepted premise of blank media royalties.81
Although the compensation received by copyright
holders through such royalties may not perfectly
offset the compensation lost through private copying,
copyright holders certainly prefer getting some money
to none at all.
Internet service providers would receive
protection from infringement liability. While they
have not been targeted for contributory infringement
claims yet,82 they may one day find themselves in those
crosshairs. While it is true that the Internet is capable
of substantial non-infringing uses, under Grokster,
such a capability would not necessarily protect Internet
service providers from liability.83 A compromise would
solidify that protection, and Internet service providers
would not even pay for it themselves since they
80. See infra Part III for the practical implications.
81. See Fisher, supra note 71, at 86–87.
82. Online service providers already have been targeted
for contributory infringement claims. See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v.
YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 25–26 (2d Cir. 2012).
83. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913,
935–36 (2005).
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could pass on any costs to the customers.84 Similarly,
Internet service providers would become immune
from lawsuits regardless of the degree of knowledge
they had regarding infringing content, which currently
has become an increasingly contentious part of the
DMCA’s safe harbor protections.85
Finally, what would such a compensation
scheme mean for the piracy problem? Establishing
a compensation scheme would not directly solve the
piracy problem, but it likely would do so indirectly.
Websites that offer unauthorized downloads and
transfers of copyrighted content would have no reason
to shut themselves down initially. However, once
copyright owners fully embrace the model of providing
content for free, which is not really free, the piracy
websites would no longer be providing a unique
service. The competition from legitimate sources of
content would likely push them out of existence.86
That is how the solution would work in theory.
How such a compensation scheme would work in
practice, if it would work at all, requires an entirely
different analysis.
III.		Understanding the Nature of All 		
Interested Parties, Particularly the 		
	Consumers, in the Internet Context is 		
	Crucial to Maintaining the Relevancy of
	Copyright Law Online
Aside from the legal concerns, numerous
policy concerns need to be addressed to adopt a new
compensation scheme that would radically alter how
the entertainment industry operates online. When
considering the difficulties, however, it remains
important to remember what necessitates them—a
demonstration of consumer desire and the adjustment
that copyright law must make to continue to serve the
public interest. The SOPA/PIPA protests showed that
the consumers of the Internet and its content cared
more about ensuring the free and open exchange of
ideas than they did about eliminating online piracy.
The previous section framed the conflict
84. Cable systems and blank media producers operate in
this fashion by transferring the costs of such statutory fees to their
customers through their prices.
85. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006); YouTube, 676 F.3d at 30.
86. Consider the example of the prohibition of alcohol. See
U.S. Const. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933). During Prohibition,
criminal figures amassed great wealth because they were willing to
provide a service that legitimate business could not. See Organized
Crime—American Mafia, Law Library—American Law and Legal
Information, http://law.jrank.org/pages/11944/Organized-CrimeAmerican-Mafia.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2012). After the repeal
of Prohibition, such criminal elements no longer had a market
because what was once illegal was now legal. See id.

largely, if not exclusively, in terms of copyright holders
versus technology developers. However, through
all the conflicts, the consumers have always been an
interested party.87 What the SOPA/PIPA protest also
showed was that, properly mobilized, the consumers
have tremendous power in fighting legislation.88
Dealing with the newly empowered class of consumers
requires examining just what to make of the strong
resistance that consumers have towards copyright
enforcement online. On the one hand, this resistance
may be characterized as market failure. In that sense,
the problem is a familiar one, and one that familiar
solutions could easily address. On the other hand,
this resistance may reveal the revolutionary impact
the Internet has had in shaping culture. The Internet’s
anarchical structure and participatory culture may have
fundamentally altered the way in which the public
interacts with media and entertainment in the digital
space. If that is the case, then the challenge becomes
finding a solution that will be regarded as legitimate
both to the Internet constituency and to the original aim
of copyright law.
A.

Characterizing the Piracy Problem as
Market Failure

Even if the entertainment and media industries
resist abandoning traditional business models with the
argument that the new compensation scheme is not
fair and that it undermines the market,89 the law has an
answer to those arguments. There are many instances
in which the government must institute a regulatory
scheme to ensure that certain socially desirable ends
are met.90 More relevantly, the legislative history of
87. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“The monopoly privileges that Congress may
authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide
a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by
which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended
to . . . allow the public access to the products of [creative] genius
after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.”).
88. See Brodsky, supra note 62.
89. A statutory licensing or royalty scheme need not be
completely unresponsive to market forces. For example, royalty
payments could be made to various artists based on the amount of
play their audio or video receives. See Fisher, supra note 71, at
223–24. See generally Online Measurement, Nielsen.com, http://
nielsen.com/us/en/measurement/online-measurement.html (last
visited Nov. 29, 2012).
90. The most notable example of a government-imposed
compensation scheme would be taxes, used to pay for public goods.
See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural
and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors,
82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1610–11 (1982) (discussing the
compulsory payment for public goods dynamic). Understandably,
government regulation of the creative industries would be highly
undesirable, but it is worth noting that creative industries such as
television and radio have long been subject to federal regulation.
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the Copyright Act’s statutory licensing sections has
provided that the government may step in and impose
a compensation scheme when there is market failure.91
The question then becomes: has there been a failure
in the online market for copyrighted content such as
music and movies?
Copyright holders would argue that the market
has not failed, but merely needs stricter enforcement
to ensure its function. However, stricter enforcement
has rarely been the answer when copyright confronts
technology, as the examples of statutory licensing
and blank media royalties have demonstrated. Nor
does enforcement appear particularly effective given
the online piracy problem. Certainly, if piracy is the
problem to the extent that the motion picture and
music industries make it out to be,92 piracy itself may
be considered to be a market failure in the sense that
there appears to be a widespread unwillingness to pay
for copyrighted content in the traditional sense.93 A
statutorily imposed compensation scheme then very
well could solve the problem in the same way that taxes
solve the public goods problem,94 and just as statutory
licensing cable licensing solved the retransmission
consent problem for cable and satellite television.
If piracy itself constitutes market failure, then
the resistance shown by consumers to SOPA/PIPA may
be characterized as market failure as well. Perhaps
consumers resist the imposition of laws to enforce the
traditional business models because they do not find
the traditional business models to be worth protection.95
91. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 89 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5704.
92. See discussion supra note 60.
93. The entertainment industry seems to believe that the
unwillingness results from the public’s ignorance that such practices
are illegal and harmful, as evidenced by their efforts to reeducate
the public through public service announcements. Eric Perrott,
Relatively New Anti-Piracy PSA: Another Analogy Comparison
of Piracy to Stealing Cars or an Effective Message?, Am. U.
Intell. Prop. Brief (May 12, 2011, 8:37 AM), http://www.ipbrief.
net/2011/05/14/relatively-new-anti-piracy-psa-another-analogycomparison-of-piracy-to-stealing-cars-or-an-effective-message/.
However, if the public innately or instinctively believes that a
practice is legal, no amount of reeducation is likely to dissuade
individuals from continuing that practice. Again, consider
the example of Prohibition. See generally Sylvia Engdahl,
Amendments XVIII and XXI: Prohibition and Repeal (Greenhaven
2009) (noting that respect for the law greatly diminished during the
unpopular prohibition of alcohol). In such instances, the law must
bend to the will of the people or else risk criminalizing a substantial
portion of the public who had no real intention to violate the law.
94. See Gordon, supra note 90, at 1610–11.
95. See Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks 462 (Yale
Press 2006) (“Ubiquitous low-cost processors, storage media,
and networked connectivity have made it practically feasible for
individuals, alone and in cooperation with others, to create and
exchange information, knowledge, and culture in patterns of social
reciprocity, redistribution, and sharing, rather than proprietary,
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Perhaps the old business models are no longer
supportable.96 The introduction of a new compensation
scheme may be precisely what is needed then to serve
the interests of all parties.
B.

Legitimizing the Law in the Culture of
Cyberspace

A far larger problem would be the highly
likely scenario that consumers, and the technology
developers,97 reject any kind of statutorily mandated
payment to copyright holders.98 In other words,
what do the consumers really get out of such a new
statutory compensation arrangement? Theoretically,
consumers would receive the ability to do what they
have wanted to do all along—that is, to consume and
use copyrighted works freely. That is not to say that
copying and distributing songs over the Internet would
suddenly become legalized.99 However, being that it
no longer presents a problem to copyright holders, the
threat of legal action disappears to the point where
it becomes de facto legal. The problem with this
theoretical benefit is that consumers may do whatever
they desire, no matter what the law is.
To look at it another way, the piracy problem
and the consumer resistance to laws aimed at greater
suppression of piracy may indicate that there is a
fundamental disconnect between the consumers
and producers of copyrighted works on the Internet.
Furthermore, the protests demonstrate that even the
lawmakers themselves severely misread the reactions
of the people. The consumers—the users of the
Internet—may have no desire to accommodate either
copyright holders or the law in an effort to maintain
any semblance of the current framework of intellectual
property.100
market-based production.”).
96. See id. at 468.
97. The consumers play a major role in whether Internet
service providers would accept the new compensation scheme. The
incentive for Internet service providers to pay these royalties lies in
the potential immunity from litigation. However, providers would
only be willing to pay if consumers were willing to bear the added
costs.
98. See Mike Masnick, Why A Music Tax Is A Bad Idea,
Techdirt (Dec. 9, 2008, 11:40 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20081209/0144083060.shtml.
99. This sentiment is an important distinction because even
the Audio Home Recording Act’s provision shields developers of
recording technology, not users, just as the DMCA shields online
service providers and not end users. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 1008
(2006), with id. § 512.
100. See generally John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the
Independence of Cyberspace, EFF.org (last visited Oct. 19, 2012),
https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html; Josh Levy,
After SOPA: A Declaration of Internet Freedom, HuffingtonPost.
com (July 1, 2012, 10:32 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/josh-
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In light of this, the equally possible notion
is perhaps the Internet creates a jurisdiction where
traditional copyright simply cannot be enforced to
the extent that it is enforced outside of cyberspace.101
Might the Internet be governed by a different set of
laws or rules than the physical world?102 Is the Internet
every bit the haven for lawless rogues that the high
seas were for pirates during the golden age of piracy?103
Perhaps, then, the lawless pirates understand more
about cyberspace than the law and lawmakers.
Alternatively, framed another way, the culture
of the Internet, and its empowering effect on the
individual, could offer another explanation for the
power shift whereby consumers want to take control
of the content they support and consume. The Internet
and social media have conditioned users to be more
vocal and participatory.104 No longer will consumers
sit idly by and allow the industries they support to
remain callous to their desires about how they want
to consume media.105 This shift is not necessarily a

bad thing and may simply represent the next step in
cultural evolution. Evolution requires adaptation. The
entertainment industry simply needs to adapt and to
bend more to the will of their consumers, or customers.
This should be nothing new to the industry, which like
any business, ought to obey the age-old maxim that the
customer is always right.106
Throughout all of this, the law need only do
one thing to remain legitimate: continue to promote
the public interest. And the public has spoken that
they have more interest in keeping the Internet free of
controls and regulations if such control means even
the potential of stifling ideas and innovation online.
Insomuch as the free expression of ideas is every bit
as crucial to the progress of the sciences and the useful
arts, if not more so than financial incentives, copyright
law would continue to fulfill its original, constitutional
mandate even if it no longer facilitated traditional
market-based compensation to copyright holders.

levy/after-sopa-a-declaration_b_1641959.html.
101. See Madhavi Sunder, From Goods to the Good Life 29
(Yale University Press 2012) (stating that “[m]eanwhile, rapid-fire
technological advances and new forms of creative output, from
YouTube and MySpace to the advent of open-source collaborative
networks, garage bands, remix culture, and the World Wide
Web itself, undermine utilitarian intellectual property law’s very
premise: that intellectual property rights are necessary to incentivize
creation.” This suggests that technological advances may even
undermine the incentive based purpose of intellectual property
law.).
102. See generally Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse:
What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 501 (1999).
103. The fictional Captain Jack Sparrow, from Disney’s
Pirates of the Caribbean franchise, espouses that the only rules
that matter are defined solely by the capabilities of any individual.
Pirates of the Caribbean: The Curse of the Black Pearl (Walt
Disney Studios 2003) (“The only rules that really matter are these:
what a man can do and what a man can’t do.”).
104. See Sunder, supra note 101, at 35 (“Changing
technologies and social mores have made culture more interactive
and participatory.”). Might the exclusionary nature of intellectual
property protection then be fundamentally at odds with the
evolution of an increasingly inclusionary culture? Some theorists
would argue that the Internet almost demands a shift from
proprietary models of production towards nonproprietary ones. See
Benkler, supra note 95, at 462.
105. See Benkler, supra note 95, at 467 (“Some of the
time that used to be devoted to passive reception of standardized
finished goods through a television is now reoriented towards
communicating and making together with others, in both tightly and
loosely knit social relations.”). Furthermore, despite their role as
the audience for content, consumers are often an afterthought when
players in the entertainment industry fight over money, as evidenced
by the dropping of certain television networks and programs during
carriage disputes between television programmers and distributors.
See Brian Stelter, DirecTV-Viacom Dispute Turns Into Blackout
Reality, Media Decoder—NYTimes.com (July 11, 2012, 10:19 AM),
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/11/viacom-directvstandoff-causes-channel-blackout-in-20-million-households/.
Consumers may now be able to make their displeasure known in

Copyright does not function merely to grant
copyright holders exclusive rights to their works,
but rather the law also must promote progress in the
creative fields. Copyright is not a tool for maintaining
control of copyrighted works as a means to preserve
business models for maximizing profits from creative
works. It merely provides incentives that will promote
creative expression. The incentives—financial
compensation—are the means, not the ends towards
which copyright law strives to achieve. Understanding
this fundamental principle of copyright law will be
crucial to working out a compromise, a peace accord,
of sorts between copyright holders and the online
community—including both technology developers and
consumers.
The music and movie industries are only a
couple of the many industries that must contemplate
how to adapt to online distribution of their products.
Books may soon have to deal with the same problem
as electronic books become the norm. Finally, as video
drives the increase in broadband technology, television
will soon migrate online as well. While the natural
tendency may be to hold onto the business models that
have worked offline, the nature of the Internet may
ultimately frustrate those efforts. Instead, all parties
involved would be better served to look forward and
implement a system that better serves the interests of

IV.		Conclusion

much louder ways than in the past.
106. The industry already cares deeply about what consumers
want. It needs only now to pay more attention to how the
consumers want to view and use that content.
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the consumers, consisting of the greater public who
use the Internet more and more with each passing day.
Considering that the purpose of copyright law also
functions to promote the interests of the public, there
is no reason why copyright should not also change to
accommodate the demands of the Internet community.
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